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RUEHROV
DE RUEHNE #1974 1151233
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251233Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5139
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0068
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6034
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3483
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1992
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4875
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4514
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6797
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001974

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DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, PM/RSAT, AND NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MARR](#) [MASS](#) [MOPS](#) [PTER](#) [IZ](#) [IN](#)

SUBJECT: INDIA CAPABLE BUT UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN IRAQ

REF: SECSTATE 54925

Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

1. (C) The Government of India (GOI) is capable of sending both military and civilian resources to help accomplish the mission in Iraq, but the will to do so does not exist. In 2003, when the U.S. first approached the GOI to contribute troops to Iraq, then-Prime Minister Vajpayee's initial reaction was positive. When Parliament debated the subject later, however, there was widespread opposition from political parties across the spectrum to sending Indian troops or civilians to Iraq. Even the rightist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which supported U.S. goals, was deeply divided on sending Indian troops. Many political parties were concerned about pleasing their Muslim vote blocs and, in light of impending 2004 elections, put pressure on Vajpayee to keep India out of the war in Iraq. While a different government is in power now, it is a shaky coalition, and concerns about Iraq are even more acute. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA)-ruled government must consider the views of Muslim constituencies, vital to its political survival, who would not/not be in favor of participation in the Iraq coalition. Post suggests that approaching the Indian government at this time for the contribution of troops and/or civilians would be unlikely to succeed.
KAESTNER